Born Joseph Frank Kowzewski, he served as Joe F. Koszewski, serial number 557958, with his surname also spelled Koszeuski. After considerable effort Sgt. Koszewski's grave marker was corrected to spell his surname as the rest of his family is buried, Koszewski in place of it's former spelling Koszeuski.
In 1921 military grave registration paperwork requested that Sgt. Koszewski's burial marker be corrected to Koszewski.
When the final stone marker replaced the original wood and aluminum marker, the surname was engraved incorrectly and not corrected.
In 2022 the military agreed to make the correction and fabricate a new marker.
SERGT. KOSZEWSKI DEAD.
Soldier From South Bend Previously reported as Missing.
Sergt., Joseph E. (F.) Koszewski, 1329 Dunham street, this city, previously reported In the official casualty lists, as missing In action, is dead.
Investigation by the army has disclosed this fact and a correction has been made In the casualty list.
South Bend Tribune
11 Jun 1919 Page 19
Sgt. Joseph Frank Koszewski of South Bend, Indiana was killed August 7, 1918 during the Second Battle of the Marne.
Sgt. Koszewski was a member of the 47th Infantry, 4th Division.
He was the son of Peter and Dora Koszewski of South Bend, Indiana.
Sgt. Koszewski died a hero in the truest sense of the word and his service and sacrifice in the Great War will not be forgotten.
100 years on since the Great War and the memory of the conditions that Sgt. Joe Koszeuski fought and ultimately gave his life should be context.
"47th Infantry AAR at Vesle River-August 6, 1918
(Excerpted from Infantry In Battle, The Infantry Journal, Washington DC, 1939, Page-79)
On August 6, 1918, the U. S. 47th Infantry (in brigade reserve) occupied a defensive position in the northern part of the Bois de Dole.
The 39th Infantry, then in the front line, had been trying to cross the Vesle and establish a line along the Rouen-Reims road, but this regiment had suffered so heavily from artillery fire that its relief appeared imminent. The commander of the 2d Battalion of the 47th Infantry realized this. Furthermore, he believed that his battalion would take part in this relief and then drive forward as an assault element. Finally, he was convinced that orders for this operation would arrive that night.
Acting on this assumption, the battalion commander moved forward during the afternoon and made a detailed personal reconnaissance of the front line near St. Thibaut. There he learned a good deal from the officers of the 39th; among other things that the Vesle was "not very deep" and that, except for a few snipers along the river and in Bazoches, there would be little or no resistance between the river and the road. From this information it appeared that a night relief of the front line and a subsequent move to the river could be made with little difficulty.
After he had completed his reconnaissance, he returned to the Bois de D'Ile, assembled his company commanders on a wooded hill that commanded a view of the front line, and acquainted them with the situation. Then, with the aid of a map, he issued an oral warning order, in substance as follows:
The enemy, supported by considerable artillery, holds the heights north of the Vesle. A few machine guns and snipers occupy scattered positions north of the Rouen-Reims Road. The 39th Infantry reports one of their battalions across the river. Our engineers have been constructing foot bridges over the river. The river itself is twenty or thirty feet wide and not very deep. In the event we are directed to relieve the 39th Infantry, we will probably be ordered to cross the Vesle and take up a position on the Rouen-Reims Road. If our battalion is in the assault, the boundary lines of the present 39th Infantry sector will be maintained. They are shown on the map and include the town of Bazoches. The direction of advance will be due north. Companies G and H will be in the assault echelon and Companies E and F in support; Company H on the right supported by Company E. If the advance from St. Thibaut is to the Rouen-Reims Road, companies will form for the movement in the sunken road immediately east of St. Thibaut. As your companies arrive at this point you will take up whatever formation you believe best.
Throughout the night the rain came down in torrents. About midnight the regimental commander received a message to report to brigade headquarters, located at Chartreuve Farm. There he received an oral order directing the 47th Infantry to relieve the 39th by 5:00 a.m., cross the Vesle and establish a line on the Rouen-Reims road. Two companies of the 11th Machine-Gun Battalion were attached to the regiment. Boundaries were the same as those of the 39th Infantry. Bazoches would be pinched out by a combined French and American advance.
Returning at 1:00 a.m. to his command post in the Bois de D'Ile, the regimental commander assembled his unit leaders and issued a brief oral order, which was similar to the warning order issued by the commander of the 2d Battalion during the afternoon. The 2d Battalion was designated as the assault unit; the 3d Battalion, with the regimental machine-gun company attached, was ordered in support; and the 1st Battalion was held in regimental reserve. Battalions were directed to move out at once in the order: 2d, 3d, 1st.
The regimental commander then proceeded to St. Thibaut.
Darkness and heavy rain made reconnaissance almost impossible.
The forethought of the commander of the 2d Battalion now served its purpose. He assembled his company commanders and explained the battalion's mission. He stated that no information, other than that already given, was available and that the orders he had issued during the afternoon would be carried out. He then directed his adjutant to bring up the battalion as soon as it could be assembled, and left for St. Thibaut.
At 2:00 a.m. on August 7 the regiment, covered by a small advance guard, marched on St. Thibaut. No guides were furnished. The road was a knee-deep quagmire. Dead men and animals added to natural obstructions of the narrow way. Slowly, and with great difficulty, the column struggled forward. The enemy continued to shell the road, but owing to the darkness this fire was largely ineffective. In reply, American artillery steadily shelled the heights north of the river.
About 3:30 a.m. the 2d Battalion reached St. Thibaut, where it was met by the battalion commander. He told his company commanders that he had been unable to obtain any additional information but that the situation looked worse than had been represented to him the previous day. In fact, the only protection against hostile machine guns and snipers lay in reaching the Rouen-Reims road before daylight.
The 2d Battalion moved quickly to the sunken road 200 yards east of the village, took up an approach-march formation and at 3:45 a.m. moved out. Enemy artillery fire increased. The 3d Battalion, followed by the 1st, moved slowly along the St. Thibaut road, in order to allow the 2d Battalion time to clear the sunken road.
The regimental commander was extremely anxious to have his assault battalion reach the Rouen-Reims road before daylight; therefore he personally directed the initial stage of the approach to the river.
The enemy evidently expected the relief, for an artillery barrage was laid on the sunken road, the roads leading into St. Thibaut, and on the village itself.
Dawn was breaking and a light mist hung over the ground as the 2d Battalion crossed the narrow-gauge railroad track north of the sunken road. Three hundred yards more brought the battalion to the river. Foot bridges reported to have been constructed by the engineers could not be located. The company commander of the right company moved forward and attempted to wade the river. In so doing he made two discoveries: first, that wire entanglements extended from the middle of the stream to the opposite bank; second, that the stream was too deep for wading. Nevertheless, a few officers and noncommissioned officers managed to struggle across. Once across they made another disheartening discovery: the north bank was wired with a line of double apron entanglements and beyond this with a line of spirals. The noncommissioned officers who had reached the far bank at once began to cut gaps through the wire while the officers strove to get the troops across as quickly as possible.
Meanwhile, enemy artillery had opened up on the river line with mustard gas. In order to expedite the crossing, heavy articles of equipment such as grenades, bandoliers, and automatic-rifle clips, were thrown across. Many of these items fell in the river and were lost. All men who could swim were then ordered to sling their rifles and swim across. The water was soon full of struggling soldiers. Leggins were lost, clothing slashed to ribbons, and many men badly cut about the arms and legs by the entanglements. Several soldiers were drowned. Men who could not swim were pulled across on crude rafts improvised out of any buoyant material that came to hand.
As the line moved forward through the wire the mist lifted and immediately the assault waves came under heavy enfilade machine-gun fire from the left flank. It was now broad daylight.
Although sustaining severe casualties, the two assault companies succeeded in pushing on to a line about 50 yards short of the Rouen-Reims Road. The remainder of the regiment, however, was cut off along the Vesle by hostile artillery fire.
After several days of fruitless effort, all units were withdrawn to the south bank.
DISCUSSION. This example shows some of the reasons why time-and-space calculations taken from the book often go awry. It also shows how time can be wasted and how it can be saved.
First, consider the situation at midnight. Brigade headquarters wanted the 47th Infantry to move forward and reach the Rouen-Reims Road by daylight. This meant that the 47th would have to make a night march of at least three miles, partly across country, in a torrential rain, and with a stream crossing included.
The regimental commander was called back to the brigade command post to receive his orders. He did not get back to his own command post until 1:00 a.m. It appears that time might have been saved had the order been sent forward instead of calling the colonel back. On his return he assembled his officers and issued his order. Another hour went by before the regiment moved out. If the officers had been assembled prior to the return of the colonel, time again could have been saved and time, as usual, was vitally important.
Secondly, we see the valuable results of the preparation made by the commander of the 2d Battalion. During the afternoon he had made his reconnaissance. He had gone over the situation with his subordinates. He had issued a tentative order based on the probable course of action. When he found that the regimental order coincided with his surmise, all he had to say was, "The orders I gave this afternoon will be carried out."
The 47th Infantry started on its three-mile march at 2:00 a.m. It appeared just possible for it to reach the Rouen-Reims Road by 5:00 a.m. provided the march was continuous and no obstacles were encountered.
Unfortunately, the 47th did meet obstacles-serious ones. Rain fell in torrents, the road was knee-deep in mud, dead animals and men blocked the way, the enemy shelled the road and no guides were furnished. The 2d Battalion, leading, did not reach St. Thibaut until 3:30 a.m., did not leave the sunken road, where it changed to combat formation, until 3:45 a.m., and did not reach the Vesle until dawn. The foot bridges could not be found and further advance was opposed by enemy fire.
Calculations of time and space were evidently based on rates of march without allowances for unforeseen contingencies. An hour, or even a half-hour, saved in launching the movement would have been invaluable in this instance where time was a paramount consideration."
In 1921 military grave registration paperwork requested that Sgt. Koszewski's burial marker be corrected to Koszewski.
When the final stone marker replaced the original wood and aluminum marker, the surname was engraved incorrectly and not corrected.
In 2022 the military agreed to make the correction and fabricate a new marker.
SERGT. KOSZEWSKI DEAD.
Soldier From South Bend Previously reported as Missing.
Sergt., Joseph E. (F.) Koszewski, 1329 Dunham street, this city, previously reported In the official casualty lists, as missing In action, is dead.
Investigation by the army has disclosed this fact and a correction has been made In the casualty list.
South Bend Tribune
11 Jun 1919 Page 19
Sgt. Joseph Frank Koszewski of South Bend, Indiana was killed August 7, 1918 during the Second Battle of the Marne.
Sgt. Koszewski was a member of the 47th Infantry, 4th Division.
He was the son of Peter and Dora Koszewski of South Bend, Indiana.
Sgt. Koszewski died a hero in the truest sense of the word and his service and sacrifice in the Great War will not be forgotten.
100 years on since the Great War and the memory of the conditions that Sgt. Joe Koszeuski fought and ultimately gave his life should be context.
"47th Infantry AAR at Vesle River-August 6, 1918
(Excerpted from Infantry In Battle, The Infantry Journal, Washington DC, 1939, Page-79)
On August 6, 1918, the U. S. 47th Infantry (in brigade reserve) occupied a defensive position in the northern part of the Bois de Dole.
The 39th Infantry, then in the front line, had been trying to cross the Vesle and establish a line along the Rouen-Reims road, but this regiment had suffered so heavily from artillery fire that its relief appeared imminent. The commander of the 2d Battalion of the 47th Infantry realized this. Furthermore, he believed that his battalion would take part in this relief and then drive forward as an assault element. Finally, he was convinced that orders for this operation would arrive that night.
Acting on this assumption, the battalion commander moved forward during the afternoon and made a detailed personal reconnaissance of the front line near St. Thibaut. There he learned a good deal from the officers of the 39th; among other things that the Vesle was "not very deep" and that, except for a few snipers along the river and in Bazoches, there would be little or no resistance between the river and the road. From this information it appeared that a night relief of the front line and a subsequent move to the river could be made with little difficulty.
After he had completed his reconnaissance, he returned to the Bois de D'Ile, assembled his company commanders on a wooded hill that commanded a view of the front line, and acquainted them with the situation. Then, with the aid of a map, he issued an oral warning order, in substance as follows:
The enemy, supported by considerable artillery, holds the heights north of the Vesle. A few machine guns and snipers occupy scattered positions north of the Rouen-Reims Road. The 39th Infantry reports one of their battalions across the river. Our engineers have been constructing foot bridges over the river. The river itself is twenty or thirty feet wide and not very deep. In the event we are directed to relieve the 39th Infantry, we will probably be ordered to cross the Vesle and take up a position on the Rouen-Reims Road. If our battalion is in the assault, the boundary lines of the present 39th Infantry sector will be maintained. They are shown on the map and include the town of Bazoches. The direction of advance will be due north. Companies G and H will be in the assault echelon and Companies E and F in support; Company H on the right supported by Company E. If the advance from St. Thibaut is to the Rouen-Reims Road, companies will form for the movement in the sunken road immediately east of St. Thibaut. As your companies arrive at this point you will take up whatever formation you believe best.
Throughout the night the rain came down in torrents. About midnight the regimental commander received a message to report to brigade headquarters, located at Chartreuve Farm. There he received an oral order directing the 47th Infantry to relieve the 39th by 5:00 a.m., cross the Vesle and establish a line on the Rouen-Reims road. Two companies of the 11th Machine-Gun Battalion were attached to the regiment. Boundaries were the same as those of the 39th Infantry. Bazoches would be pinched out by a combined French and American advance.
Returning at 1:00 a.m. to his command post in the Bois de D'Ile, the regimental commander assembled his unit leaders and issued a brief oral order, which was similar to the warning order issued by the commander of the 2d Battalion during the afternoon. The 2d Battalion was designated as the assault unit; the 3d Battalion, with the regimental machine-gun company attached, was ordered in support; and the 1st Battalion was held in regimental reserve. Battalions were directed to move out at once in the order: 2d, 3d, 1st.
The regimental commander then proceeded to St. Thibaut.
Darkness and heavy rain made reconnaissance almost impossible.
The forethought of the commander of the 2d Battalion now served its purpose. He assembled his company commanders and explained the battalion's mission. He stated that no information, other than that already given, was available and that the orders he had issued during the afternoon would be carried out. He then directed his adjutant to bring up the battalion as soon as it could be assembled, and left for St. Thibaut.
At 2:00 a.m. on August 7 the regiment, covered by a small advance guard, marched on St. Thibaut. No guides were furnished. The road was a knee-deep quagmire. Dead men and animals added to natural obstructions of the narrow way. Slowly, and with great difficulty, the column struggled forward. The enemy continued to shell the road, but owing to the darkness this fire was largely ineffective. In reply, American artillery steadily shelled the heights north of the river.
About 3:30 a.m. the 2d Battalion reached St. Thibaut, where it was met by the battalion commander. He told his company commanders that he had been unable to obtain any additional information but that the situation looked worse than had been represented to him the previous day. In fact, the only protection against hostile machine guns and snipers lay in reaching the Rouen-Reims road before daylight.
The 2d Battalion moved quickly to the sunken road 200 yards east of the village, took up an approach-march formation and at 3:45 a.m. moved out. Enemy artillery fire increased. The 3d Battalion, followed by the 1st, moved slowly along the St. Thibaut road, in order to allow the 2d Battalion time to clear the sunken road.
The regimental commander was extremely anxious to have his assault battalion reach the Rouen-Reims road before daylight; therefore he personally directed the initial stage of the approach to the river.
The enemy evidently expected the relief, for an artillery barrage was laid on the sunken road, the roads leading into St. Thibaut, and on the village itself.
Dawn was breaking and a light mist hung over the ground as the 2d Battalion crossed the narrow-gauge railroad track north of the sunken road. Three hundred yards more brought the battalion to the river. Foot bridges reported to have been constructed by the engineers could not be located. The company commander of the right company moved forward and attempted to wade the river. In so doing he made two discoveries: first, that wire entanglements extended from the middle of the stream to the opposite bank; second, that the stream was too deep for wading. Nevertheless, a few officers and noncommissioned officers managed to struggle across. Once across they made another disheartening discovery: the north bank was wired with a line of double apron entanglements and beyond this with a line of spirals. The noncommissioned officers who had reached the far bank at once began to cut gaps through the wire while the officers strove to get the troops across as quickly as possible.
Meanwhile, enemy artillery had opened up on the river line with mustard gas. In order to expedite the crossing, heavy articles of equipment such as grenades, bandoliers, and automatic-rifle clips, were thrown across. Many of these items fell in the river and were lost. All men who could swim were then ordered to sling their rifles and swim across. The water was soon full of struggling soldiers. Leggins were lost, clothing slashed to ribbons, and many men badly cut about the arms and legs by the entanglements. Several soldiers were drowned. Men who could not swim were pulled across on crude rafts improvised out of any buoyant material that came to hand.
As the line moved forward through the wire the mist lifted and immediately the assault waves came under heavy enfilade machine-gun fire from the left flank. It was now broad daylight.
Although sustaining severe casualties, the two assault companies succeeded in pushing on to a line about 50 yards short of the Rouen-Reims Road. The remainder of the regiment, however, was cut off along the Vesle by hostile artillery fire.
After several days of fruitless effort, all units were withdrawn to the south bank.
DISCUSSION. This example shows some of the reasons why time-and-space calculations taken from the book often go awry. It also shows how time can be wasted and how it can be saved.
First, consider the situation at midnight. Brigade headquarters wanted the 47th Infantry to move forward and reach the Rouen-Reims Road by daylight. This meant that the 47th would have to make a night march of at least three miles, partly across country, in a torrential rain, and with a stream crossing included.
The regimental commander was called back to the brigade command post to receive his orders. He did not get back to his own command post until 1:00 a.m. It appears that time might have been saved had the order been sent forward instead of calling the colonel back. On his return he assembled his officers and issued his order. Another hour went by before the regiment moved out. If the officers had been assembled prior to the return of the colonel, time again could have been saved and time, as usual, was vitally important.
Secondly, we see the valuable results of the preparation made by the commander of the 2d Battalion. During the afternoon he had made his reconnaissance. He had gone over the situation with his subordinates. He had issued a tentative order based on the probable course of action. When he found that the regimental order coincided with his surmise, all he had to say was, "The orders I gave this afternoon will be carried out."
The 47th Infantry started on its three-mile march at 2:00 a.m. It appeared just possible for it to reach the Rouen-Reims Road by 5:00 a.m. provided the march was continuous and no obstacles were encountered.
Unfortunately, the 47th did meet obstacles-serious ones. Rain fell in torrents, the road was knee-deep in mud, dead animals and men blocked the way, the enemy shelled the road and no guides were furnished. The 2d Battalion, leading, did not reach St. Thibaut until 3:30 a.m., did not leave the sunken road, where it changed to combat formation, until 3:45 a.m., and did not reach the Vesle until dawn. The foot bridges could not be found and further advance was opposed by enemy fire.
Calculations of time and space were evidently based on rates of march without allowances for unforeseen contingencies. An hour, or even a half-hour, saved in launching the movement would have been invaluable in this instance where time was a paramount consideration."
Born Joseph Frank Kowzewski, he served as Joe F. Koszewski, serial number 557958, with his surname also spelled Koszeuski. After considerable effort Sgt. Koszewski's grave marker was corrected to spell his surname as the rest of his family is buried, Koszewski in place of it's former spelling Koszeuski.
In 1921 military grave registration paperwork requested that Sgt. Koszewski's burial marker be corrected to Koszewski.
When the final stone marker replaced the original wood and aluminum marker, the surname was engraved incorrectly and not corrected.
In 2022 the military agreed to make the correction and fabricate a new marker.
SERGT. KOSZEWSKI DEAD.
Soldier From South Bend Previously reported as Missing.
Sergt., Joseph E. (F.) Koszewski, 1329 Dunham street, this city, previously reported In the official casualty lists, as missing In action, is dead.
Investigation by the army has disclosed this fact and a correction has been made In the casualty list.
South Bend Tribune
11 Jun 1919 Page 19
Sgt. Joseph Frank Koszewski of South Bend, Indiana was killed August 7, 1918 during the Second Battle of the Marne.
Sgt. Koszewski was a member of the 47th Infantry, 4th Division.
He was the son of Peter and Dora Koszewski of South Bend, Indiana.
Sgt. Koszewski died a hero in the truest sense of the word and his service and sacrifice in the Great War will not be forgotten.
100 years on since the Great War and the memory of the conditions that Sgt. Joe Koszeuski fought and ultimately gave his life should be context.
"47th Infantry AAR at Vesle River-August 6, 1918
(Excerpted from Infantry In Battle, The Infantry Journal, Washington DC, 1939, Page-79)
On August 6, 1918, the U. S. 47th Infantry (in brigade reserve) occupied a defensive position in the northern part of the Bois de Dole.
The 39th Infantry, then in the front line, had been trying to cross the Vesle and establish a line along the Rouen-Reims road, but this regiment had suffered so heavily from artillery fire that its relief appeared imminent. The commander of the 2d Battalion of the 47th Infantry realized this. Furthermore, he believed that his battalion would take part in this relief and then drive forward as an assault element. Finally, he was convinced that orders for this operation would arrive that night.
Acting on this assumption, the battalion commander moved forward during the afternoon and made a detailed personal reconnaissance of the front line near St. Thibaut. There he learned a good deal from the officers of the 39th; among other things that the Vesle was "not very deep" and that, except for a few snipers along the river and in Bazoches, there would be little or no resistance between the river and the road. From this information it appeared that a night relief of the front line and a subsequent move to the river could be made with little difficulty.
After he had completed his reconnaissance, he returned to the Bois de D'Ile, assembled his company commanders on a wooded hill that commanded a view of the front line, and acquainted them with the situation. Then, with the aid of a map, he issued an oral warning order, in substance as follows:
The enemy, supported by considerable artillery, holds the heights north of the Vesle. A few machine guns and snipers occupy scattered positions north of the Rouen-Reims Road. The 39th Infantry reports one of their battalions across the river. Our engineers have been constructing foot bridges over the river. The river itself is twenty or thirty feet wide and not very deep. In the event we are directed to relieve the 39th Infantry, we will probably be ordered to cross the Vesle and take up a position on the Rouen-Reims Road. If our battalion is in the assault, the boundary lines of the present 39th Infantry sector will be maintained. They are shown on the map and include the town of Bazoches. The direction of advance will be due north. Companies G and H will be in the assault echelon and Companies E and F in support; Company H on the right supported by Company E. If the advance from St. Thibaut is to the Rouen-Reims Road, companies will form for the movement in the sunken road immediately east of St. Thibaut. As your companies arrive at this point you will take up whatever formation you believe best.
Throughout the night the rain came down in torrents. About midnight the regimental commander received a message to report to brigade headquarters, located at Chartreuve Farm. There he received an oral order directing the 47th Infantry to relieve the 39th by 5:00 a.m., cross the Vesle and establish a line on the Rouen-Reims road. Two companies of the 11th Machine-Gun Battalion were attached to the regiment. Boundaries were the same as those of the 39th Infantry. Bazoches would be pinched out by a combined French and American advance.
Returning at 1:00 a.m. to his command post in the Bois de D'Ile, the regimental commander assembled his unit leaders and issued a brief oral order, which was similar to the warning order issued by the commander of the 2d Battalion during the afternoon. The 2d Battalion was designated as the assault unit; the 3d Battalion, with the regimental machine-gun company attached, was ordered in support; and the 1st Battalion was held in regimental reserve. Battalions were directed to move out at once in the order: 2d, 3d, 1st.
The regimental commander then proceeded to St. Thibaut.
Darkness and heavy rain made reconnaissance almost impossible.
The forethought of the commander of the 2d Battalion now served its purpose. He assembled his company commanders and explained the battalion's mission. He stated that no information, other than that already given, was available and that the orders he had issued during the afternoon would be carried out. He then directed his adjutant to bring up the battalion as soon as it could be assembled, and left for St. Thibaut.
At 2:00 a.m. on August 7 the regiment, covered by a small advance guard, marched on St. Thibaut. No guides were furnished. The road was a knee-deep quagmire. Dead men and animals added to natural obstructions of the narrow way. Slowly, and with great difficulty, the column struggled forward. The enemy continued to shell the road, but owing to the darkness this fire was largely ineffective. In reply, American artillery steadily shelled the heights north of the river.
About 3:30 a.m. the 2d Battalion reached St. Thibaut, where it was met by the battalion commander. He told his company commanders that he had been unable to obtain any additional information but that the situation looked worse than had been represented to him the previous day. In fact, the only protection against hostile machine guns and snipers lay in reaching the Rouen-Reims road before daylight.
The 2d Battalion moved quickly to the sunken road 200 yards east of the village, took up an approach-march formation and at 3:45 a.m. moved out. Enemy artillery fire increased. The 3d Battalion, followed by the 1st, moved slowly along the St. Thibaut road, in order to allow the 2d Battalion time to clear the sunken road.
The regimental commander was extremely anxious to have his assault battalion reach the Rouen-Reims road before daylight; therefore he personally directed the initial stage of the approach to the river.
The enemy evidently expected the relief, for an artillery barrage was laid on the sunken road, the roads leading into St. Thibaut, and on the village itself.
Dawn was breaking and a light mist hung over the ground as the 2d Battalion crossed the narrow-gauge railroad track north of the sunken road. Three hundred yards more brought the battalion to the river. Foot bridges reported to have been constructed by the engineers could not be located. The company commander of the right company moved forward and attempted to wade the river. In so doing he made two discoveries: first, that wire entanglements extended from the middle of the stream to the opposite bank; second, that the stream was too deep for wading. Nevertheless, a few officers and noncommissioned officers managed to struggle across. Once across they made another disheartening discovery: the north bank was wired with a line of double apron entanglements and beyond this with a line of spirals. The noncommissioned officers who had reached the far bank at once began to cut gaps through the wire while the officers strove to get the troops across as quickly as possible.
Meanwhile, enemy artillery had opened up on the river line with mustard gas. In order to expedite the crossing, heavy articles of equipment such as grenades, bandoliers, and automatic-rifle clips, were thrown across. Many of these items fell in the river and were lost. All men who could swim were then ordered to sling their rifles and swim across. The water was soon full of struggling soldiers. Leggins were lost, clothing slashed to ribbons, and many men badly cut about the arms and legs by the entanglements. Several soldiers were drowned. Men who could not swim were pulled across on crude rafts improvised out of any buoyant material that came to hand.
As the line moved forward through the wire the mist lifted and immediately the assault waves came under heavy enfilade machine-gun fire from the left flank. It was now broad daylight.
Although sustaining severe casualties, the two assault companies succeeded in pushing on to a line about 50 yards short of the Rouen-Reims Road. The remainder of the regiment, however, was cut off along the Vesle by hostile artillery fire.
After several days of fruitless effort, all units were withdrawn to the south bank.
DISCUSSION. This example shows some of the reasons why time-and-space calculations taken from the book often go awry. It also shows how time can be wasted and how it can be saved.
First, consider the situation at midnight. Brigade headquarters wanted the 47th Infantry to move forward and reach the Rouen-Reims Road by daylight. This meant that the 47th would have to make a night march of at least three miles, partly across country, in a torrential rain, and with a stream crossing included.
The regimental commander was called back to the brigade command post to receive his orders. He did not get back to his own command post until 1:00 a.m. It appears that time might have been saved had the order been sent forward instead of calling the colonel back. On his return he assembled his officers and issued his order. Another hour went by before the regiment moved out. If the officers had been assembled prior to the return of the colonel, time again could have been saved and time, as usual, was vitally important.
Secondly, we see the valuable results of the preparation made by the commander of the 2d Battalion. During the afternoon he had made his reconnaissance. He had gone over the situation with his subordinates. He had issued a tentative order based on the probable course of action. When he found that the regimental order coincided with his surmise, all he had to say was, "The orders I gave this afternoon will be carried out."
The 47th Infantry started on its three-mile march at 2:00 a.m. It appeared just possible for it to reach the Rouen-Reims Road by 5:00 a.m. provided the march was continuous and no obstacles were encountered.
Unfortunately, the 47th did meet obstacles-serious ones. Rain fell in torrents, the road was knee-deep in mud, dead animals and men blocked the way, the enemy shelled the road and no guides were furnished. The 2d Battalion, leading, did not reach St. Thibaut until 3:30 a.m., did not leave the sunken road, where it changed to combat formation, until 3:45 a.m., and did not reach the Vesle until dawn. The foot bridges could not be found and further advance was opposed by enemy fire.
Calculations of time and space were evidently based on rates of march without allowances for unforeseen contingencies. An hour, or even a half-hour, saved in launching the movement would have been invaluable in this instance where time was a paramount consideration."
In 1921 military grave registration paperwork requested that Sgt. Koszewski's burial marker be corrected to Koszewski.
When the final stone marker replaced the original wood and aluminum marker, the surname was engraved incorrectly and not corrected.
In 2022 the military agreed to make the correction and fabricate a new marker.
SERGT. KOSZEWSKI DEAD.
Soldier From South Bend Previously reported as Missing.
Sergt., Joseph E. (F.) Koszewski, 1329 Dunham street, this city, previously reported In the official casualty lists, as missing In action, is dead.
Investigation by the army has disclosed this fact and a correction has been made In the casualty list.
South Bend Tribune
11 Jun 1919 Page 19
Sgt. Joseph Frank Koszewski of South Bend, Indiana was killed August 7, 1918 during the Second Battle of the Marne.
Sgt. Koszewski was a member of the 47th Infantry, 4th Division.
He was the son of Peter and Dora Koszewski of South Bend, Indiana.
Sgt. Koszewski died a hero in the truest sense of the word and his service and sacrifice in the Great War will not be forgotten.
100 years on since the Great War and the memory of the conditions that Sgt. Joe Koszeuski fought and ultimately gave his life should be context.
"47th Infantry AAR at Vesle River-August 6, 1918
(Excerpted from Infantry In Battle, The Infantry Journal, Washington DC, 1939, Page-79)
On August 6, 1918, the U. S. 47th Infantry (in brigade reserve) occupied a defensive position in the northern part of the Bois de Dole.
The 39th Infantry, then in the front line, had been trying to cross the Vesle and establish a line along the Rouen-Reims road, but this regiment had suffered so heavily from artillery fire that its relief appeared imminent. The commander of the 2d Battalion of the 47th Infantry realized this. Furthermore, he believed that his battalion would take part in this relief and then drive forward as an assault element. Finally, he was convinced that orders for this operation would arrive that night.
Acting on this assumption, the battalion commander moved forward during the afternoon and made a detailed personal reconnaissance of the front line near St. Thibaut. There he learned a good deal from the officers of the 39th; among other things that the Vesle was "not very deep" and that, except for a few snipers along the river and in Bazoches, there would be little or no resistance between the river and the road. From this information it appeared that a night relief of the front line and a subsequent move to the river could be made with little difficulty.
After he had completed his reconnaissance, he returned to the Bois de D'Ile, assembled his company commanders on a wooded hill that commanded a view of the front line, and acquainted them with the situation. Then, with the aid of a map, he issued an oral warning order, in substance as follows:
The enemy, supported by considerable artillery, holds the heights north of the Vesle. A few machine guns and snipers occupy scattered positions north of the Rouen-Reims Road. The 39th Infantry reports one of their battalions across the river. Our engineers have been constructing foot bridges over the river. The river itself is twenty or thirty feet wide and not very deep. In the event we are directed to relieve the 39th Infantry, we will probably be ordered to cross the Vesle and take up a position on the Rouen-Reims Road. If our battalion is in the assault, the boundary lines of the present 39th Infantry sector will be maintained. They are shown on the map and include the town of Bazoches. The direction of advance will be due north. Companies G and H will be in the assault echelon and Companies E and F in support; Company H on the right supported by Company E. If the advance from St. Thibaut is to the Rouen-Reims Road, companies will form for the movement in the sunken road immediately east of St. Thibaut. As your companies arrive at this point you will take up whatever formation you believe best.
Throughout the night the rain came down in torrents. About midnight the regimental commander received a message to report to brigade headquarters, located at Chartreuve Farm. There he received an oral order directing the 47th Infantry to relieve the 39th by 5:00 a.m., cross the Vesle and establish a line on the Rouen-Reims road. Two companies of the 11th Machine-Gun Battalion were attached to the regiment. Boundaries were the same as those of the 39th Infantry. Bazoches would be pinched out by a combined French and American advance.
Returning at 1:00 a.m. to his command post in the Bois de D'Ile, the regimental commander assembled his unit leaders and issued a brief oral order, which was similar to the warning order issued by the commander of the 2d Battalion during the afternoon. The 2d Battalion was designated as the assault unit; the 3d Battalion, with the regimental machine-gun company attached, was ordered in support; and the 1st Battalion was held in regimental reserve. Battalions were directed to move out at once in the order: 2d, 3d, 1st.
The regimental commander then proceeded to St. Thibaut.
Darkness and heavy rain made reconnaissance almost impossible.
The forethought of the commander of the 2d Battalion now served its purpose. He assembled his company commanders and explained the battalion's mission. He stated that no information, other than that already given, was available and that the orders he had issued during the afternoon would be carried out. He then directed his adjutant to bring up the battalion as soon as it could be assembled, and left for St. Thibaut.
At 2:00 a.m. on August 7 the regiment, covered by a small advance guard, marched on St. Thibaut. No guides were furnished. The road was a knee-deep quagmire. Dead men and animals added to natural obstructions of the narrow way. Slowly, and with great difficulty, the column struggled forward. The enemy continued to shell the road, but owing to the darkness this fire was largely ineffective. In reply, American artillery steadily shelled the heights north of the river.
About 3:30 a.m. the 2d Battalion reached St. Thibaut, where it was met by the battalion commander. He told his company commanders that he had been unable to obtain any additional information but that the situation looked worse than had been represented to him the previous day. In fact, the only protection against hostile machine guns and snipers lay in reaching the Rouen-Reims road before daylight.
The 2d Battalion moved quickly to the sunken road 200 yards east of the village, took up an approach-march formation and at 3:45 a.m. moved out. Enemy artillery fire increased. The 3d Battalion, followed by the 1st, moved slowly along the St. Thibaut road, in order to allow the 2d Battalion time to clear the sunken road.
The regimental commander was extremely anxious to have his assault battalion reach the Rouen-Reims road before daylight; therefore he personally directed the initial stage of the approach to the river.
The enemy evidently expected the relief, for an artillery barrage was laid on the sunken road, the roads leading into St. Thibaut, and on the village itself.
Dawn was breaking and a light mist hung over the ground as the 2d Battalion crossed the narrow-gauge railroad track north of the sunken road. Three hundred yards more brought the battalion to the river. Foot bridges reported to have been constructed by the engineers could not be located. The company commander of the right company moved forward and attempted to wade the river. In so doing he made two discoveries: first, that wire entanglements extended from the middle of the stream to the opposite bank; second, that the stream was too deep for wading. Nevertheless, a few officers and noncommissioned officers managed to struggle across. Once across they made another disheartening discovery: the north bank was wired with a line of double apron entanglements and beyond this with a line of spirals. The noncommissioned officers who had reached the far bank at once began to cut gaps through the wire while the officers strove to get the troops across as quickly as possible.
Meanwhile, enemy artillery had opened up on the river line with mustard gas. In order to expedite the crossing, heavy articles of equipment such as grenades, bandoliers, and automatic-rifle clips, were thrown across. Many of these items fell in the river and were lost. All men who could swim were then ordered to sling their rifles and swim across. The water was soon full of struggling soldiers. Leggins were lost, clothing slashed to ribbons, and many men badly cut about the arms and legs by the entanglements. Several soldiers were drowned. Men who could not swim were pulled across on crude rafts improvised out of any buoyant material that came to hand.
As the line moved forward through the wire the mist lifted and immediately the assault waves came under heavy enfilade machine-gun fire from the left flank. It was now broad daylight.
Although sustaining severe casualties, the two assault companies succeeded in pushing on to a line about 50 yards short of the Rouen-Reims Road. The remainder of the regiment, however, was cut off along the Vesle by hostile artillery fire.
After several days of fruitless effort, all units were withdrawn to the south bank.
DISCUSSION. This example shows some of the reasons why time-and-space calculations taken from the book often go awry. It also shows how time can be wasted and how it can be saved.
First, consider the situation at midnight. Brigade headquarters wanted the 47th Infantry to move forward and reach the Rouen-Reims Road by daylight. This meant that the 47th would have to make a night march of at least three miles, partly across country, in a torrential rain, and with a stream crossing included.
The regimental commander was called back to the brigade command post to receive his orders. He did not get back to his own command post until 1:00 a.m. It appears that time might have been saved had the order been sent forward instead of calling the colonel back. On his return he assembled his officers and issued his order. Another hour went by before the regiment moved out. If the officers had been assembled prior to the return of the colonel, time again could have been saved and time, as usual, was vitally important.
Secondly, we see the valuable results of the preparation made by the commander of the 2d Battalion. During the afternoon he had made his reconnaissance. He had gone over the situation with his subordinates. He had issued a tentative order based on the probable course of action. When he found that the regimental order coincided with his surmise, all he had to say was, "The orders I gave this afternoon will be carried out."
The 47th Infantry started on its three-mile march at 2:00 a.m. It appeared just possible for it to reach the Rouen-Reims Road by 5:00 a.m. provided the march was continuous and no obstacles were encountered.
Unfortunately, the 47th did meet obstacles-serious ones. Rain fell in torrents, the road was knee-deep in mud, dead animals and men blocked the way, the enemy shelled the road and no guides were furnished. The 2d Battalion, leading, did not reach St. Thibaut until 3:30 a.m., did not leave the sunken road, where it changed to combat formation, until 3:45 a.m., and did not reach the Vesle until dawn. The foot bridges could not be found and further advance was opposed by enemy fire.
Calculations of time and space were evidently based on rates of march without allowances for unforeseen contingencies. An hour, or even a half-hour, saved in launching the movement would have been invaluable in this instance where time was a paramount consideration."
Inscription
Joe F. Koszewski
SERGT. 47th INF. 4 DIV.
INDIANA AUG. 7, 1918
Gravesite Details
Indiana
